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Analysis: Delhi Protests - RAFs Use of Anti-Riot Guns and Pellet Firing Revelations

Beyond the Smoke: How Delhi’s Anti‑Riot Gun Disclosure Reshapes Crowd‑Control Policy in India

Introduction

The revelation that the Rapid Action Force (RAF) employed an anti‑riot gun (ARG) loaded with plastic pellets during the “Cockroach Janata Party” (CJP) “Sansad Chalo” march on 20 July has ignited a fresh debate on the transparency of law‑enforcement tactics in India’s capital. While the Delhi Police initially denied any use of pellet ammunition, a police diary recovered from the Parliament Street police station records two rounds of plastic pellets being fired, alongside a suite of other crowd‑management devices. This discrepancy is more than a matter of record‑keeping; it raises fundamental questions about accountability, the legal framework governing non‑lethal weapons, and the ripple effects on regional policing strategies, especially in the North‑East where protests have occasionally escalated into violent confrontations.

Main Analysis

At the heart of the controversy lies a simple yet powerful data point: the diary entry lists 55 non‑electrical shells, 15 electrical shells, five tear‑smoke grenades, two anti‑riot guns, two ballistic cartridges, and two plastic‑pellet rounds deployed by the RAF on the day of the protest. The presence of the two pellet rounds directly contradicts the police’s public claim that “no pellet guns were used.” This contradiction highlights three interrelated issues that merit close scrutiny.

1. Transparency and Institutional Credibility

When a law‑enforcement agency publicly denies the use of a particular weapon while internal records state otherwise, it erodes public trust. A 2022 survey by the Centre for Policy Research found that 68 % of Delhi residents perceived the police as “partially transparent” in handling protests, a figure that fell to 52 % after the 2020 Delhi riots. The current episode threatens to push that perception even lower, especially among youth activists who rely on social media for real‑time updates. The gap between official statements and documentary evidence underscores the need for an independent audit mechanism that can verify the deployment of non‑lethal weapons in real time.

2. Legal Ambiguities Surrounding Non‑Lethal Arms

India’s Arms Act of 1959 and the Arms Rules of 2016 categorize anti‑riot guns as “non‑lethal weapons,” yet they do not prescribe a clear protocol for their use in civilian gatherings. The Supreme Court, in State v. Kumar (2021), emphasized that any use of force must be “proportionate, necessary, and minimally invasive.” However, the lack of a statutory definition for “pellet ammunition” leaves room for interpretation. The two plastic‑pellet rounds recorded in the diary could be classified either as “less‑lethal” or “potentially lethal,” depending on muzzle velocity and distance. This legal gray area fuels the controversy and invites litigation, as seen in the 2019 Jammu & Kashmir case where families of injured protesters filed a public interest litigation demanding stricter guidelines for pellet‑gun usage.

3. Operational Implications for Regional Policing

The North‑East states—particularly Assam, Manipur, and Nagaland—have witnessed a surge in protest activity over land rights, ethnic autonomy, and economic grievances. In 2023, the North‑Eastern Council reported a 27 % increase in public demonstrations compared with 2020. Police forces in these regions often look to Delhi’s RAF as a benchmark for crowd‑control tactics. If the capital’s police force is perceived to be opaque about its use of ARGs, regional forces may either adopt a more secretive stance or, conversely, push for stricter oversight. Both outcomes have practical consequences: a secretive approach could exacerbate mistrust among local communities, while heightened oversight may delay response times during volatile situations.

Examples

To contextualize the Delhi incident, it is useful to examine three comparable episodes across the country where the deployment of anti‑riot weapons sparked public outcry and policy reassessment.

Example 1: 2020 Delhi Riots – The Pellet‑Gun Debate

During the February 2020 communal riots, the Delhi Police used a combination of tear‑gas canisters and pellet‑gun shells. Independent monitoring groups documented at least 12 injuries attributed to pellet impact, prompting the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) to recommend a moratorium on pellet‑gun usage in densely populated areas. The recommendation was partially adopted, leading to a 40 % reduction in pellet‑gun deployments in Delhi between 2020 and 2022, according to the Delhi Police Annual Report.

Example 2: 2022 Assam Farmers’ Protest – Use of Water Cannons

In May 2022, a massive farmers’ rally in Guwahati turned confrontational when police deployed water cannons at a distance of 30 meters. The incident resulted in 18 reported injuries, including two cases of severe eye damage. A subsequent inquiry revealed that the water‑cannon pressure exceeded the recommended 2 bar limit, violating the State Police Manual. The fallout led the Assam State Government to introduce a “Non‑Lethal Weapons Oversight Committee,” which now requires a written authorization before any water‑cannon or ARG deployment.

Example 3: 2023 Nagaland Student Walkout – Ballistic Cartridge Controversy

During a student walkout in Kohima, police fired two ballistic cartridges as a warning shot. While no injuries were reported, the act was deemed “unnecessary” by the Nagaland Human Rights Commission, which cited the “principle of proportionality” under Indian law. The commission’s report spurred the state’s Home Department to issue a circular mandating that all ballistic cartridges be logged in a digital ledger accessible to the public within 24 hours of use.

Conclusion

The disclosure that the RAF fired two plastic‑pellet rounds during the CJP “Sansad Chalo” march is a watershed moment for policing policy in India. It forces a reckoning on three fronts: the credibility of law‑enforcement agencies, the adequacy of legal frameworks governing non‑lethal weapons, and the operational ripple effects on regional police forces. By confronting the data—55 non‑electrical shells, 15 electrical shells, five tear‑smoke grenades, two anti‑riot guns, two ballistic cartridges, and two pellet rounds—policy‑makers can craft a more transparent, accountable, and regionally sensitive approach to crowd control.

Practical steps forward include establishing an independent, digitally‑enabled audit trail for all non‑lethal weapon deployments, revising the Arms Rules to explicitly define permissible ammunition types, and creating a national forum where state and union‑territory police forces can share best practices without compromising transparency. If these measures are adopted, the incident that once threatened to deepen public mistrust could instead become a catalyst for a more humane and accountable policing paradigm—one that respects the right to protest while safeguarding public safety across the diverse tapestry of India’s regions.