Analysis: Why Cabo Verde’s Rejection of Spain’s Claims Matters for West Africa and the EU
Introduction
In early 2024 the government of Cabo Verde publicly dismissed a series of demands issued by the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning maritime jurisdiction, fisheries access, and migration management. While the headline “Cabo Verde Deny Mighty Spain” reads like a diplomatic showdown, the underlying dispute is rooted in a complex web of historical treaties, economic interdependence, and shifting geopolitical priorities. This article unpacks the origins of the disagreement, evaluates the legal and economic stakes for both parties, and explores the broader implications for regional cooperation in West Africa, the European Union’s Atlantic strategy, and the future of trans‑Atlantic resource governance.
Main Analysis
Historical Context and Legal Foundations
Since gaining independence from Portugal in 1975, Cabo Verde has cultivated a pragmatic relationship with Spain, the EU’s largest fishing nation. The 2007 Fisheries Partnership Agreement (FPA) granted Spanish vessels access to Cabo Verde’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in exchange for annual payments of €12 million and technology transfer commitments. The agreement was renewed in 2015 with a modest increase to €15 million, reflecting the growing value of the archipelago’s tuna stocks.
Spain’s claim, however, extends beyond the 200‑nautical‑mile EEZ defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Madrid argues that a historic “traditional fishing area” (TFA) predating the 1995 UNCLOS ratifications gives Spanish vessels a de‑facto right to operate up to 300 nautical miles from Cabo Verde’s coast. This interpretation conflicts with Cabo Verde’s 2019 submission to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which delineated a 200‑nautical‑mile EEZ and sought recognition of its sovereign rights over the continental shelf.
In February 2024, Spain’s ambassador to Praia submitted a diplomatic note requesting “clarification” of the TFA and urging the Cabo Verdean authorities to “re‑engage” the 2007 FPA under the broader historic framework. The Cabo Verdean foreign ministry responded with a formal denial, citing UNCLOS Article 56, which unequivocally limits EEZ rights to 200 nautical miles, and emphasizing that any historic rights must be mutually negotiated, not unilaterally asserted.
Economic Stakes: Fisheries, Tourism, and Trade
Fishing is the single most lucrative sector for Cabo Verde’s maritime economy. According to the Ministry of Fisheries, the archipelago’s tuna catch averaged 28,000 metric tons in 2023, generating roughly €85 million in export revenue. Spanish vessels accounted for 42 % of the total catch, a share that has risen from 30 % in 2010 due to fleet modernization and the adoption of satellite‑based monitoring systems.
Should Spain’s broader claim be accepted, Cabo Verde could lose an estimated €6–8 million in annual licensing fees, representing 7 % of its fisheries budget. Moreover, the archipelago’s nascent eco‑tourism sector—valued at €45 million in 2023—relies on the perception of a well‑managed marine environment. Over‑exploitation by foreign fleets could jeopardize coral reef health, undermining tourism growth projections of 5 % per year through 2030.
Beyond fisheries, bilateral trade between the two nations totals €210 million annually, with Spain supplying 38 % of Cabo Verde’s imports, including refined petroleum, machinery, and processed foods. The denial of Spain’s claim therefore carries a risk of retaliatory trade measures, which could affect Cabo Verde’s already fragile balance of payments.
Geopolitical Dynamics and Regional Security
The Atlantic Ocean has become a strategic corridor for both European and African actors. Cabo Verde’s location—approximately 570 km off the West African coast—makes it a pivotal node for anti‑piracy patrols, search‑and‑rescue operations, and migration monitoring. In 2022, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) recorded 1,842 irregular arrivals from West Africa to the Canary Islands, with Cabo Verde serving as a primary staging point for many migrants.
Spain has leveraged its maritime capabilities to support regional security initiatives, contributing patrol vessels and joint training exercises under the EU’s “Atlantic Partnership” framework. The denial of Spain’s historic fishing rights, however, could strain this cooperation. A 2023 joint statement between the EU and ECOWAS highlighted the need for “harmonized maritime governance” to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing—a goal that could be undermined if diplomatic friction escalates.
Furthermore, the dispute resonates with other West African states confronting similar pressures. Morocco’s 2021 claim over the Western Sahara’s offshore resources and Mauritania’s 2020 disagreement with the EU over fisheries subsidies illustrate a broader pattern: African coastal nations are increasingly asserting sovereignty over marine assets, while European powers seek to preserve historic access.
Practical Applications: Policy Options for Cabo Verde
Faced with Spain’s assertive stance, Cabo Verde has three pragmatic pathways:
- Negotiated Settlement: Initiate a trilateral dialogue involving the EU, Cabo Verde, and Spain to renegotiate the FPA, potentially converting the historic claim into a time‑bound, revenue‑sharing arrangement. A model could be the 2019 “Joint Fisheries Management Plan” between the EU and Senegal, which caps catch volumes while guaranteeing €20 million in annual compensation.
- Legal Arbitration: Submit the dispute to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). While arbitration can be costly, precedent from the “South China Sea Arbitration” (2016) demonstrates that small states can successfully defend EEZ rights against larger claimants.
- Strategic Diversification: Reduce reliance on Spanish fishing licenses by expanding partnerships with emerging markets such as China’s state‑owned fishing conglomerates, which have shown interest in West African waters. Simultaneously, invest in domestic aquaculture—currently representing only 2 % of total fish production—to offset potential revenue losses.
Each option carries trade‑offs. Negotiated settlements preserve diplomatic goodwill but may lock Cabo Verde into lower‑than‑market rates. Arbitration offers legal certainty but risks antagonizing a key trade partner. Diversification reduces vulnerability but requires upfront capital—estimated at €30 million for a mid‑size offshore aquaculture facility.
Examples
Case Study 1: The 2007 Fisheries Partnership Agreement
The original 2007 FPA granted Spain a quota of 12,000 tons of tuna per year, in exchange for €12 million in annual fees. By 2022, the quota had been exceeded by 18 %, prompting Cabo Verde to impose a €2 million penalty. Spain’s response was to request a “review of the historic fishing area”—the same language now resurfacing in diplomatic notes. This precedent illustrates how incremental over‑catch can evolve into broader jurisdictional claims.